Top 10 similar words or synonyms for warheads

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Top 30 analogous words or synonyms for warheads

Article Example
ကျူးဘားဒုံးပျံအရေးအခင်း In early 1992, it was confirmed that Soviet forces in Cuba had, by the time the crisis broke, received tactical nuclear warheads for their artillery rockets and Il-28 bombers. Castro stated that he would have recommended their use if the US invaded despite knowing Cuba would be destroyed.
ကျူးဘားဒုံးပျံအရေးအခင်း At the time when the Kennedy administration thought that the Cuban Missile Crisis was resolved, nuclear tactical rockets stayed in Cuba since they were not part of the Kennedy-Khrushchev understandings. However, the Soviets changed their minds, fearing possible future Cuban militant steps, and at November 22, 1962 the Soviet Deputy Prime Minister Anastas Mikoyan told Castro that those rockets with the nuclear warheads, were being removed too.
တိုင်ဖွန်း တိုင်ဖွန်းအမျိုးအစားသည် ရုရှားတို့၏ ငါးမန်းဟုအဓိပ္ပာယ်ရသည့် အကူလာအမျိုးအစားရေငုပ်သင်္ဘောစီမံချက် ၉၄၁ မှပေါ်ပေါက်လာခြင်းဖြစ်သည်။ It is sometimes confused with other submarines, as Akula is the name NATO uses to designate the Russian Project 971 "Shchuka-B" (Щука-Б) class attack submarines. The project was developed with the objective to match the SLBM armament of s, capable of carrying 192 nuclear warheads, 100 kt each. However, at the time, state-of-the-art Soviet SLBMs were substantially larger and heavier than their American counterparts (the R-39 is more than two times heavier than the Trident I; it remains the heaviest SLBM in service worldwide). The submarine had to be scaled accordingly.
ကျူးဘားဒုံးပျံအရေးအခင်း BBC journalist Joe Matthews published on October 13, 2012 the story behind the 100 tactical nuclear warheads mentioned by Graham Allison in the excerpt above. Khrushchev feared that Castro's hurt pride and widespread Cuban indignation over the concessions he had made to Kennedy might lead to a breakdown of the agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States. In order to prevent this Khrushchev decided to make Cuba a special offer. The offer was to give Cuba more than 100 tactical nuclear weapons that had been shipped to Cuba along with the long-range missiles, but which crucially had passed completely under the radar of US intelligence. Khrushchev concluded that because the Americans hadn't listed the missiles on their list of demands, the Soviet Union's interests would be well served by keeping them in Cuba.
ကျူးဘားဒုံးပျံအရေးအခင်း The EXCOMM then discussed the effect on the strategic balance of power, both political and military. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that the missiles would seriously alter the military balance, but Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara disagreed. He was convinced that the missiles would not affect the strategic balance at all. An extra forty, he reasoned, would make little difference to the overall strategic balance. The US already had approximately 5,000 strategic warheads, while the Soviet Union had only 300. He concluded that the Soviets having 340 would not therefore substantially alter the strategic balance. In 1990, he reiterated that "it made "no" difference...The military balance wasn't changed. I didn't believe it then, and I don't believe it now."
တိုင်ဖွန်း Typhoon submarines are among the most quiet Russian sea vessels in operation, being quieter and yet more maneuverable than their predecessors. Besides their missile armament, the Typhoon class features six torpedo tubes; four are designed to handle RPK-2 (SS-N-15) missiles or Type 53 torpedoes, and the other two are designed to launch RPK-7 (SS-N-16) missiles, Type 65 torpedoes, or mines. A Typhoon-class submarine can stay submerged for periods up to 120 days in normal conditions, and potentially more if deemed necessary (e.g., in the case of a nuclear war). Their primary weapons system is composed of 20 R-39 (NATO: SS-N-20) ballistic missiles (SLBM) with a maximum of 10 MIRV nuclear warheads each.
ဗွီ-၂ ဒုံးပျံ The V-2 lacked a proximity fuse, so it could not be set for air burst; it buried itself in the target area before or just as the warhead detonated. This reduced its effectiveness. Furthermore, its early guidance systems were too primitive to hit specific targets and its costs were approximately equivalent to four-engined bombers, which were more accurate (though only in a relative sense), had longer ranges, carried many more warheads, and were reusable. Moreover, it diverted resources from other, more effective programs. Nevertheless, it had a considerable psychological effect because, unlike bombing planes or the V-1 Flying Bomb (which made a characteristic buzzing sound), the V-2 travelled faster than the speed of sound, with no warning before impact, no possibility of defence and there was no risk of attacking pilot and crew casualties.