Top 10 similar words or synonyms for casualties

occasionally    0.989333

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mainly    0.986078

patrol    0.985986

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Top 30 analogous words or synonyms for casualties

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Article Example
ဗွီ-၁ ဗုံးပျံ The policy of diverting V-1 impacts away from central London was initially controversial. The War Cabinet refused to authorise a measure which would increase casualties in any area, even if it reduced casualties elsewhere by greater amounts. It was thought that Churchill would reverse this decision later (he was then away at a conference); but the delay in starting the reports to Germans might be fatal to the deception. So Sir Findlater Stewart of Home Defence Executive took responsibility for starting the deception programme immediately. His action was approved by Churchill when he returned.
မြန်မာဘုရင့်တပ်မတော် The siege warfare was a frequent feature during the small kingdoms period (14th to 16th centuries) when the small kingdoms or even vassal states maintained fortified defenses. By the 1550s, the Portuguese cannon had forced a shift from wood to brick and stone fortifications. Moreover, the Portuguese guns may have encouraged a new emphasis on inflicting casualties, rather than or in addition to taking prisoners.
ဗွီ-၁ ဗုံးပျံ While Pujol downplayed the extent of V-1 damage, trouble came from "Ostro", an "Abwehr" agent in Lisbon who pretended to have agents reporting from London. He told the Germans that London had been devastated and had been mostly evacuated due to enormous casualties. The Germans could not perform aerial reconnaissance of London, and believed his damage reports in preference to Pujol's. They thought that the Allies would make every effort to destroy the V-1 launch sites in France. They also accepted "Ostro"'s impact reports. Due to Ultra however, the Allies read his messages and adjusted for them.
ဗွီ-၂ ဒုံးပျံ The defence against the V-2 campaign was to destroy the launch infrastructure—expensive in terms of bomber resources and casualties—or to cause the Germans to "aim" at the wrong place through disinformation. The British were able to convince the Germans to direct V-1s and V-2s aimed at London to less populated areas east of the city. This was done by sending false impact reports via the German espionage network in Britain, which was controlled by the British (the Double Cross System).
ဗွီ-၂ ဒုံးပျံ The V-2 lacked a proximity fuse, so it could not be set for air burst; it buried itself in the target area before or just as the warhead detonated. This reduced its effectiveness. Furthermore, its early guidance systems were too primitive to hit specific targets and its costs were approximately equivalent to four-engined bombers, which were more accurate (though only in a relative sense), had longer ranges, carried many more warheads, and were reusable. Moreover, it diverted resources from other, more effective programs. Nevertheless, it had a considerable psychological effect because, unlike bombing planes or the V-1 Flying Bomb (which made a characteristic buzzing sound), the V-2 travelled faster than the speed of sound, with no warning before impact, no possibility of defence and there was no risk of attacking pilot and crew casualties.
ဗွီ-၁ ဗုံးပျံ A certain number of the V-1s fired had been fitted with radio transmitters, which had clearly demonstrated a tendency for the V-1 to fall short. "Oberst" Max Wachtel, commander of Flak Regiment 155(W), which was responsible for the V-1 offensive, compared the data gathered by the transmitters with the reports obtained through the double agents. He concluded, when faced with the discrepancy between the two sets of data, that there must be a fault with the radio transmitters, as he had been assured that the agents were completely reliable. It was later calculated that if Wachtel had disregarded the agents' reports and relied on the radio data, he would have made the correct adjustments to the V-1's guidance, and casualties might have increased by 50% or more.
ဘီ-၂ ကိုယ်ပျောက်ဗုံးကြဲလေယာဉ် The B-2's combat debut was in 1999, during the Kosovo War. It was responsible for destroying 33% of selected Serbian bombing targets in the first eight weeks of U.S. involvement in the War. During this war, B-2s flew non-stop to Kosovo from their home base in Missouri and back. The B-2 was the first aircraft to deploy GPS satellite-guided JDAM "smart bombs" in combat use in Kosovo. The use of JDAMs and precision-guided munitions effectively replaced the controversial tactic of carpet-bombing, which had been harshly criticised due to it causing indiscriminate civilian casualties in prior conflicts, such as the 1991 Gulf War. On 7 May 1999, a B-2 accidentally deployed five JDAMs in a target building that was actually the Chinese Embassy, killing several staff.
ဗွီ-၁ ဗုံးပျံ The V-1 was developed at Peenemünde Airfield by the German "Luftwaffe" during the Second World War. During initial development it was known by the codename "Cherry Stone". The first of the so-called "Vergeltungswaffen" series designed for terror bombing of London, the V-1 was fired from "ski" launch sites along the French (Pas-de-Calais) and Dutch coasts. The first V-1 was launched at London on 13 June 1944, one week after (and prompted by) the successful Allied landing in Europe. At its peak, more than one hundred V-1s a day were fired at southeast England, 9,521 in total, decreasing in number as sites were overrun until October 1944, when the last V-1 site in range of Britain was overrun by Allied forces. This caused the remaining V-1s to be directed at the port of Antwerp and other targets in Belgium, with 2,448 V-1s being launched. The attacks stopped when the last site was overrun on 29 March 1945. In total, the V-1 attacks caused 22,892 casualties (almost entirely civilians).